Tag: Contiant

Norway’s strict payment ban on unlicensed gambling is being quietly undermined by a new, layered payments stack. Using Revolut as an “entry wallet” and Payoro as a withdrawal hub, offshore casinos and their affiliates appear to have created a de facto alternative banking route for Norwegian players—far from the reach of domestic banks and regulators.

A Dutch player alleges deposits to an unlicensed casino (WinHero) were processed via Yapily’s Lithuanian payment-initiation entity and a third-party (Klyme). A leaked compliance email suggests Yapily pushed Klyme to blacklist the complaining user while requesting KYB/KYC details—raising hard questions about open-banking merchant controls, geo-fencing, and complaints handling.

The Dutch gambling regulator Kansspelautoriteit (KSA) has imposed a €4,228,000 administrative fine on Starscream Limited for offering illegal online gambling to Dutch players via Rantcasino, AllstarzCasino, and SugarCasino. The case underlines what FinTelegram has been documenting for months: these are not “minor violations,” but systematic breaches—and the payment stack enabling them is part of the risk surface.

Recent whistleblower reports and online investigative publications in January 2026 allege that SoftSwiss, through its Malta-licensed entity Stable Aggregator Limited (MGA/B2B/942/2022), operates as an unlicensed payment hub and money laundering facilitator for affiliated casino operators targeting prohibited jurisdictions. The allegations assert that SoftSwiss processes payments from unlicensed merchants.

In December 2025, FinTelegram flagged Contiant Ltd (Bulgaria) as a “technical” open-banking layer sitting in front of Yapily's PSD2 rails, enabling pay-by-bank deposits for offshore casino brands apparently offered into restricted markets. New traffic intelligence now points to a strong Benelux banking footprint—and to SkyHills as a dominant feeder into Contiant’s payment gateway.

FinTelegram has published an enhanced 28‑page Compliance Report on the open banking infrastructure provider Yapily operated by Yapily Connect Ltd (UK) and Yapily Connect UAB (Lithuania), analysing the company’s high‑profile partnership with Google and its problematic role as open‑banking infrastructure for illegal offshore casinos. The report is now available for professional download and will be updated quarterly.​

FinTelegram’s casino mystery-shopping and payment-stack reviews keep surfacing the same pattern: Revolut appears as a funding option for offshore casinos that seem accessible from restricted EU markets, with deposits executed via open-banking “pay-by-bank” flows. We ask players and whistleblowers for additional information.

FinTelegram’s latest compliance analysis flags Contiant Ltd (Bulgaria) as a payment “technical service provider” (TSP) sitting in front of Yapily Connect UAB (licensed/authorized PSD2 rail), enabling account-to-account “pay-by-bank” deposits into offshore casino brands that appear to target restricted markets—most notably the Netherlands.

This report profiles Contiant Ltd, a Bulgaria-based payment processor that has emerged as a critical financial gateway for illegal offshore gambling operators. Our investigation confirms that Contiant acts as a "Technical Service Provider" (TSP), effectively piggybacking on the regulated open banking infrastructure of Yapily Connect UAB.

Online casinos are easily transferable digital assets. The transfer of Gammix Ltd's casinos to offshore operator Starscream Ltd raises serious questions about the continued illegal gambling activities in Europe. Despite massive penalties from the Dutch regulator KSA, Gammix appears to have simply shifted its operations offshore, where it continues to flout regulatory oversight facilitated by regulated payment processors.

As part of our follow-the-money strategy, which involves systematic analysis of high-risk sectors, we have identified a new domain being utilized for processing payments related to unauthorized online casinos and gambling operations: ChanneltoPay.com. This domain is not associated with any visible website and appears to function solely as a payment gateway (API). We are seeking to determine the registrant and operator responsible for this payment domain.