BPCE-Backed Bridge in the Rail Map: How Perspecteev’s Payment Initiation Stack Appears in Deposits to Illegal Offshore Casinos

Ben
Sat, 21 Mar 2026 08:51:01 +0000
Illegal gambling, Illegal Payment Services, Rail Atlas Cases, ticker, ACPR, ANJ, Bitkingz, Bridge, Dama, Germany, GGL, Groupe BPCE, Hollycorn, illegal casinos, Jet4Bet, Open Banking, pay303, payment initiation, Perspecteev, SaferSEPA, Softswiss, Truffle Capital

A new FinTelegram Rail Atlas analysis shows Perspecteev SAS, the French payment institution behind the Bridge brand, appearing in deposit flows linked to offshore casino brands targeting German users — with opaque gateway labels such as “SaferSEPA” sitting between the casino front end and the regulated payment-initiation layer.

Key Findings

Perspecteev SAS is a real, regulated French payment institution operating under the Bridge brand, with public corporate registration and institutional backing from Groupe BPCE and Truffle Capital.

Bridge/Perspecteev appears in the final authorization stage of deposit flows linked to offshore casino brands targeting German users, according to the submitted rail-map evidence.

The intermediary layer includes “SaferSEPA”, a public-facing label with little or no meaningful legal disclosure, creating a transparency gap in the merchant-facing part of the payment chain.

Germany’s gambling framework explicitly prohibits participation in payments connected to unauthorized gambling, and violations can trigger enforcement and significant fines.

France’s gambling regulator ANJ has publicly stated that payment service providers are part of the illegal-gambling enforcement perimeter, especially where offshore operators target French or European players.

The case fits a broader Rail Atlas pattern: illegal front end → opaque gateway/intermediary → regulated payments touchpoint → bank authorization.

A Regulated French PISP Turns Up in Illegal-Casino Payment Rails

FinTelegram has reviewed a detailed source memorandum on Perspecteev SAS and the use of its Bridge payment-initiation infrastructure in deposit flows tied to offshore casinos targeting German users. The submitted material documents step-by-step deposit journeys in which the end user is ultimately asked by Revolut to authorize PERSPECTEEV SAS, while the merchant layer presented by Bridge is labeled “SaferSepa.com.”

Perspecteev SAS is not an obscure shell. It is a French payment institution registered under SIREN 529 196 313, headquartered at 4 rue de la Pierre Levée, 75011 Paris, and publicly listed as an active company in the French business register. Public corporate records also show that Anna Maj has served as president since June 2025 and Alexis Roque as directeur général since October 2024.

Bridge’s own 2022 funding round was substantial: €20 million from Truffle Capital and Groupe BPCE, the latter describing itself in the announcement as France’s second-largest banking group. The same release described Bridge as the brand of Perspecteev SAS and said the company was the first European player approved under PSD2 by the French regulator.

That makes the appearance of Perspecteev in offshore gambling deposit rails especially relevant. This is not a fringe provider at the edge of the market. It is a regulated, institutionally backed open-banking player operating inside mainstream European payments.

Rail Atlas Findings: Phantom SaferSEPA as Bridge Merchant

The expert report submitted to FinTelegram documents real‑money deposit flows from users in Germany into two SOFTSWISS‑connected offshore casinos: Jet4Bet (Hollycorn N.V.) and Bitkingz (Dama N.V.). Both operators are Curacao‑registered, have no German GGL license, and thus qualify as illegal gambling offers under the German Interstate Treaty on Gambling 2021 (GlüStV 2021).​

At the core of the payment chain is SaferSEPA, which appears as Bridge’s merchant on the Bridge consent page (pay.bridgeapi.io), where “SaferSepa.com” is displayed together with the transaction amount and an internal ID. Publicly, safersepa.com does not identify a corporate entity, license number, registered office, or management. At the time of review, the site displayed only sparse text telling users to reference a transaction subject line such as “2616 SaferSEPA.com eWallet Payment” when making inquiries. No meaningful legal disclosure is visible in the captured page text.

That matters because under the EBA’s AML framework, where a PISP has a business relationship with a payee or merchant, the merchant is the relevant customer for CDD purposes. In EBA Q&A 2021_6048, the EBA states that PISPs are not expected to perform CDD on both the payer and the payee at the same time and indicates that, in this scenario, the customer is the online merchant (payee).

If Bridge onboarded SaferSEPA or a similar intermediary as a merchant, the obvious question is: who exactly was onboarded? If it did not, then a different question follows: how is Perspecteev’s regulated initiation layer being inserted into this payment journey at all?

Perspecteev on the open-banking authorization page

The investigation shows that SaferSEPA controls the customer journey before and after the Bridge consent step, receiving the hand‑off from the casino, performing bank selection (pay303.com), and then routing to Bridge and onward to the player’s bank.

On Revolut’s open‑banking authorization page (oba.revolut.com), German users are explicitly asked to authorize PERSPECTEEV SAS, closing the loop between the unlicensed casino, the phantom gateway, and the regulated French PISP.​

Read our reports on Perspecteev here.

Rail Map: From Curacao Casinos to EU Banks

The material reviewed by FinTelegram documents two deposit journeys from Germany involving offshore casino brands Jet4Bet and Bitkingz. In both cases, the payment flow ends with the user being redirected to a Revolut authorization screen naming PERSPECTEEV SAS as the entity to be authorized. In one of the flows, the Bridge consent page itself reportedly displays “SaferSepa.com” as merchant.

The following flows were recorded from Germany using actual deposits, with each redirect documented step‑by‑step.​

Flow A – Jet4Bet (Hollycorn N.V.)

Start at jet4bet.com – deposit modal, “Open Banking”, €50.​

Redirect to secure.bankgate.io – German bank selection page showing Postbank, Commerzbank, Revolut, N26, TARGOBANK, ING (DiBa), Deutsche Bank, Berliner Sparkasse.​

User selects Revolut and is sent to oba.revolut.com – consent screen “to authorise PERSPECTEEV SAS”.​

Flow B – Bitkingz (Dama N.V.)

Start at bitkingz.com – Quick Deposit, method “Mandato Direct”, €50.​

Redirect to pay303.com – SaferSEPA‑branded loading screen.​

Redirect to pay.bridgeapi.io – Bridge consent page showing “SaferSepa.com”, €50.00, internal ID 1588662, with options “Pay with QR” and “Pay online”.​

After “Pay online”, return to pay303.com – SaferSEPA‑branded bank selection.​

Selection of Revolut triggers redirect to trx.safersepa.com (“Revolut – Payment processing”), followed by oba.revolut.com – again asking the user to authorize PERSPECTEEV SAS as PISP.​

These observations demonstrate a layered structure in which Curacao casinos front German‑language offers, SaferSEPA/pay303 act as opaque conduits, Perspecteev’s Bridge handles the regulated open‑banking initiation, and EU banks execute the underlying SEPA transfers.​​

Entities and Domains in the Rail

The evidence maps a layered structure that is by now familiar in the offshore gambling world: illegal front end, opaque gateway brand, regulated payments touchpoint, then bank authorization.

Layer | Observed entity / domain | Role

Casino front‑end

Jet4Bet (jet4bet.com),
BitKingz (bitkingz.com)

Deposit UI (“Open Banking” / “Mandato Direct”) for German users.​

Gateway | SaferSEPA / pay303.com | SaferSEPA‑branded loading screens and bank selection.​
PISP consent | pay.bridgeapi.io | Bridge payment page showing “SaferSepa.com” as merchant.​
Processing | trx.safersepa.com | SaferSEPA‑branded payment processing.​
Bank gateway (A) | secure.bankgate.io | Bank selection (German banks) for Jet4Bet flow.​
Bank authorization | oba.revolut.com | End‑user bank consent UI.​
Authorized PISP | PERSPECTEEV SAS | Named on Revolut consent screen in both flows.​

Casino Operators and SOFTSWISS Context

Both Jet4Bet and Bitkingz are part of the wider SOFTSWISS casino ecosystem, which operates dozens of Curacao‑licensed brands targeting European markets. Jet4Bet is operated by Hollycorn N.V. (Curacao #144359, license OGL/2023/176/0095) with more than 70 casino brands, while Bitkingz belongs to Dama N.V. (Curacao #152125, license OGL/2023/174/0082), successor of Direx N.V., running 100+ brands.​

Under GlüStV 2021, neither operator is authorized by the German GGL; their offers are therefore classified as illegal gambling for German residents. According to GGL reporting, the authority investigated around 1,864 websites and initiated more than 130 prohibition proceedings against Curacao‑licensed operators in 2023 alone, confirming a broad enforcement campaign against offshore gambling platforms.​

Summary Data on Perspecteev SAS

Category | Details
Legal Entity | Perspecteev SAS (France).​​
Domain | https://www.bridgeapi.io/
RatEx42 | Compliance Profile
LinkedIn | Bridge API
Registration | SIREN 529 196 313; address: 4 rue de la Pierre Levée, 75011 Paris, France.​​
Founders | Joan Burkovic (CEO), Emmanuel Costa (CTO), Robin Dauzon, David Sabbatini.​
Current leadership | Anna Maria Maj (Présidente, since Aug 2025), Alexis Roque (DG).​
Ownership | Truffle Capital and Groupe BPCE (BPCE Digital & Payments); ~€20M Series A in July 2022.​​
License | ACPR Payment Institution, REGAFI #72649, Agreement #16918 (PISP + AISP).​​
Key milestone | First European entity to receive PSD2 approval (Jan 2018).​​
Holding evidence | MORPHIC FINANCIAL GROUP LTD present on UK Companies House as related corporate entity.​
Scale | >€1.5B payments initiated; 300+ B2B clients; 8M+ accounts connected daily.​​
Observed role | Provides PISP services to SaferSEPA; named on bank consent screen in illegal casino deposit flows.​

Regulatory Exposure:

Under EBA Guidelines on ML/TF risk factors (EBA/GL/2021/02) and EBA Q&A 2021_6048, a PISP that maintains a business relationship with a payee must treat the merchant as its customer for AML and customer due diligence purposes. This implies that Bridge must identify, verify, and risk‑assess SaferSEPA/pay303, including license status, ultimate beneficial ownership, and exposure to prohibited sectors like unlicensed gambling.​

German law: PISPs are subject to payment-blocking

In the present case, SaferSEPA/pay303 have no visible legal identity and no disclosed payment or gambling license, yet control payment flows from clearly illegal German‑facing casinos to EU‑based banks via Bridge. If Bridge has formally onboarded SaferSEPA as a merchant, this points to serious deficiencies in KYB and ongoing monitoring; if not, it raises equally serious questions about the security and integrity of Bridge’s API access, including the possibility of unauthorized third‑party use.​

From a German law perspective, § 4(1) sentence 2 GlüStV 2021 prohibits participation in payments related to unlicensed gambling, and § 9(1) sentence 3 no. 4 GlüStV 2021 empowers the GGL to impose payment‑blocking orders on all participants in the payment chain, including PISPs, backed by fines of up to €500,000 per infringement.​

Three decisions have significantly clarified this position:

OVG Sachsen‑Anhalt (Oct 2023) – upheld a GGL payment‑blocking order against a PSP cooperating with PlatinCasino’s operator, confirming the broad reach of GlüStV enforcement.​

VG Halle (Oct 2024) – confirmed a blanket prohibition against a Swiss PSP for all unlicensed gambling transactions, underscoring that foreign PSPs are not shielded from German measures.​​

OVG Magdeburg (2 Dec 2024, 3 M 169/24) – explicitly addressed a Zahlungsauslösedienst (PISP) and held that PISPs are fully covered by the participation ban; the court noted that payment initiation on a gambling site typically presupposes an acceptance contract between the PISP and the operator, enabling the PISP to check national compliance.​​

The Magdeburg ruling also confirmed that German gambling law applies extraterritorially where foreign operators and payment providers target German consumers, and foreign payment providers must respect GGL prohibitions even if they are domiciled outside Germany. This interpretation places Perspecteev/Bridge squarely in the crosshairs if German regulators connect the documented SaferSEPA rails to their wider payment‑blocking practice.​

The French Regulatory Dimension

Bridge is supervised in France, and France has its own strong public-policy stance against illegal online gambling. French law generally prohibits unlicensed online casino activity, and the ANJ has become increasingly aggressive against the illegal market.

In December 2023, the ANJ said that, in the illegal market it studied, 50% of identified illegal-offer sites belonged to companies registered in Curaçao. It also stressed that it intended to act not only against illegal operators but also against payment service providers enabling the financial flows between illegal operators and players. The same ANJ page notes that since March 2022 it has had administrative powers to block and delist illegal sites and had already issued 300 blocking acts covering 1,230 URLs.

That gives the Perspecteev matter a second regulatory dimension: even if the operational harm is focused on Germany, the home-state supervisor cannot simply ignore how a French-regulated institution’s payment-initiation layer is being used.

Call for Information

FinTelegram is currently deepening its investigation into Perspecteev SAS / Bridge, SaferSEPA, pay303.com, and related intermediaries in the illegal casino payment chain. Current and former employees of Perspecteev, BPCE‑related payment entities, SaferSEPA/pay303, SOFTSWISS operators, and partner PSPs are invited to share internal documents, onboarding records, merchant risk assessments, contractual arrangements, and technical integration details with us. Reports can be filed securely and anonymously via our whistleblower platform, where every submission is handled confidentially and evaluated for inclusion in ongoing Rail Atlas investigations.​

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