Legiano “Fake-Fiat” Deposits: Chainvalley/utPay Funnels Players into USDC Transfers—Chargeback Rights Engineered Away

Charlene Lensburg
Mon, 29 Dec 2025 10:18:15 +0000
Crypto Compliance, Crypto Payment Processor Watch, Gambling Compliance, Illegal gambling, Illegal Payment Services, Rail Atlas Cases, Stablecoins, ticker, Canamoney, Canamoney Exchange, CenturaPay, Chain Valley, Chainvalley, Legiano, MiFinity, Neteller, PaySafeCard, Skrill, utPay, Utrg

Our review of offshore casino Legiano (legiano.com) shows a recurring “fake-fiat” deposit pattern: what is presented as a normal fiat top-up is, in reality, an embedded crypto purchase (USDC) that is automatically routed to the casino’s wallets via app.chainvalley.pro—with only minimal, pre-ticked disclosure.

The offshore casino Legiano, operated by Stellar Ltd under an Anjouan Gaming Board licence, has been found using deceptive “fake-fiat” deposit mechanisms that systematically mislead players about the true nature of their transactions. This compliance analysis examines the payment infrastructure and identifies substantial regulatory violations by both the casino operator and its on-ramping partners.

Our Legiano (legiano.com / legiano-1212.com) reviews shows a recurring “fake-fiat” deposit pattern: what is presented as a normal fiat top-up is, in reality, an embedded crypto purchase (USDC) that is automatically routed to the casino’s wallets via app.chainvalley.pro—with only minimal, pre-ticked disclosure. This setup shifts the transaction from “deposit to a casino” into “consumer bought crypto,” materially weakening chargeback and complaints leverage and raising AML/consumer-protection red flags for the payment processors involved.

Key Facts

Three deposit options at Legiano are branded as UTRG (Lithuania) d/b/a utPay, yet route users to app.chainvalley.pro (Source: utPay)

The checkout includes a small consent line (“buy crypto and send to the specified address”) that is already ticked; changing the destination wallet triggers warnings and appears effectively blocked.

Users ultimately purchase USDC, which is then transferred to casino wallets (example wallet provided: 0x7519…4496).

Funding for the USDC purchase is processed via Skrill/Neteller (embedded e-money rails).

Card deposits and “Jeton Bank” deposits are routed via api.payment-gateway.io

“MiFinity” deposits appear payable to CANAMONEY EXCHANGE LTD (Canada) operating as CenturaPay (Source: CenturaPay).

Anjouan’s license register lists Stellar Ltd, but legiano.com does not appear among the authorized URLs shown for Stellar Ltd (as of the register’s latest update displayed) (Sourcde: Anjouan Gaming).

Short Analysis

1) Why this is “fake-fiat” (and why it matters):

Legiano payment pup-up: Chainvalle explains that the player is actually buying USDC.e

A player believes they are depositing fiat into a gambling account. Instead, the flow converts them into a crypto purchaser, then immediately forwards the crypto to the casino. This creates a compliance “shield”: the player received the crypto they “ordered,” so chargebacks/disputes become structurally harder—precisely the opposite of what regulators expect in high-risk gambling payments (clear consent, transparent merchant purpose, and effective consumer redress).

USDC.e explainer: “USDC.e” typically denotes bridged USDC (ported from Ethereum), meaning it’s a different token contract than “native” USDC on that chain and introduces an additional bridge-risk layer on top of the casino deposit flow.

2) Likely compliance breaches and control failures (operator + on-ramper):

Misleading presentation / inadequate consent: pre-ticked crypto-purchase consent and low-salience disclosure raise unfair-commercial-practice concerns and undermine “informed authorization.”

AML/CTF & sanctions exposure: embedded on-ramps enabling offshore gambling flows demand enhanced merchant due diligence, transaction monitoring, and clear purpose labeling—especially where the end beneficiary is an offshore casino wallet.

Gambling-payments facilitation: when processors knowingly (or negligently) provide rails into unlicensed/offshore gambling, they invite regulatory scrutiny, de-risking actions, and partner terminations.

Entity Profiles (short)

Chain Valley Sp. z o.o. (chainvalley.pro / app.chainvalley.pro) — Poland

Incorporated in Poland on May 16, 2023, Chain Valley positions itself as a compliant fiat-to-crypto bridge, claiming “comprehensive legal compliance” and “streamlined KYC/AML” on its website.

Key Findings

Identified in Chainvalley policies as a Polish company (KRS 0001036419, Warsaw address) collecting extensive KYC/SOF data (Source: chainvalley.pro).

Listed in Poland’s register for virtual-currency activity (entry shows CHAIN VALLEY Sp. z o.o., KRS 0001036419) (Source: slaskie.kas.gov.pl).
Key questions: Who is the “merchant of record” in these Legiano flows, why is utPay branding used at selection, and what controls stop “embedded crypto buys” from being used as gambling-payment circumvention?

CANAMONEY EXCHANGE LTD d/b/a CenturaPay (centurapay.com) — Canada

Incorporated under the Canada Business Corporations Act, CenturaPay markets itself as a FINTRAC-registered Money Services Business and claims compliance with PCI DSS, KYC/AML, and GDPR standards. At Legiano, deposits made via the MiFinity e-wallet option are routed to CenturaPay, which acts as the payment processor of record.

Key Findings

CenturaPay states it is a trading name of CANAMONEY EXCHANGE LTD (Corp. No. BC1465281) with MSB Registration Number C100000299 and a North Vancouver business address (Source: centurapay.com)

FINTRAC notes MSBs must register and that registration is a compliance obligation (not a “quality stamp” on risk controls) (Source: fintrac-canafe.canada.ca).
Key questions: What is CenturaPay’s exact role behind MiFinity-routed deposits, and what gambling-merchant screening/monitoring is applied?

Conclusion

The Legiano case exemplifies a growing compliance blind spot: offshore casinos using crypto on-ramps to disguise the nature of player deposits, thereby bypassing traditional payment-processor controls and eliminating consumer recourse. Both Chain Valley and CenturaPay appear to prioritize transaction volume over due diligence, enabling a casino that operates without credible oversight.

Key Data Table

Brand / Role in flow | Domains observed | Legal entity (as known) | Jurisdiction | Regulatory / licensing posture (relevant) | Payment facilitators / gateways | Key notes (compliance relevance)
Legiano (offshore casino) | legiano.com | Stellar Ltd (operator, per your review) | Anjouan / Union of Comoros (offshore) | Offshore gambling licence regime (“Anjouan Gaming” / similar) | Uses multiple rails incl. crypto + PSPs below | Presents fiat-style options but routes users into crypto purchase/transfer flows (“fake-fiat”).
utPay (payment option label at casino) | utpay.io | Utrg, UAB (d/b/a utPay) | Lithuania | Crypto/on-ramp positioning (CASP/VASP-type activity implied by service + T&Cs) | Routes into Chainvalley checkout (per your screenshots) | Three “utPay” options appear in Legiano’s cashier, but actual execution is via Chainvalley.
Chainvalley (crypto on-ramp / checkout) | chainvalley.pro, app.chainvalley.pro | Chain Valley Sp. z o.o. | Poland | Listed in Poland’s virtual-currency activity register (per public register) | Skrill / Neteller fund the crypto buy; USDC forwarded to casino wallet | Core “fake-fiat” component: user is converted into “crypto buyer,” then USDC is auto-sent to casino wallet. Consent box is pre-ticked; wallet-change is practically blocked (per your screenshots).
Stablecoin used in deposit | (on-chain transfer) | USDC (stablecoin) | (issuance is non-local; token flows are global) | Cryptoasset transfer; consumer redress differs materially from card/bank deposits | Bought via Chainvalley flow; then transferred to casino wallet | Functional outcome: player can’t credibly pursue classic chargeback because they “received crypto,” which was then sent onward.
Destination wallet (casino) | (example) 0x7519d6836d1Adc49aa524840A4b0e7b471634496 | (wallet beneficiary: casino operator side) | (on-chain) | Outside card scheme redress mechanisms | Receives USDC from on-ramp flow | “Wallet hard-lock” warnings suggest intent to prevent user-controlled destination changes.
Card / “Jeton Bank” deposit gateway | api.payment-gateway.io (and payment-gateway.io) | Unknown / not transparently disclosed (from public-facing domain) | Unknown | Unknown | Processes card deposits + deposits presented as “Jeton Bank” | Gateway domain repeatedly appears in gambling-related traffic/infra; needs KYB/KYT mapping in follow-up.
MiFinity (e-wallet option at casino) | (brand-level) mifinity.com | (e-wallet operator not analysed here) | (varies) | (varies) | Player payments routed to CenturaPay/CANAMONEY (per your screenshots) | MiFinity option appears to pay an external processor, not directly the casino—needs merchant-of-record clarity.
CenturaPay (payment processor / payee in MiFinity flow) | centurapay.com | CANAMONEY EXCHANGE LTD (trading name: CenturaPay) | Canada (BC) | States MSB registration (FINTRAC MSB no. shown on site) | Receives player funds via MiFinity option (per your review) | High-risk role if servicing unlicensed gambling flows; KYB/merchant screening and transaction monitoring questions.
Skrill / Neteller (funding rails inside “crypto buy”) | skrill.com, neteller.com | (brand-level; group entity varies) | (varies) | (typically e-money/regulated PSP rails; depends on entity) | Used as payment methods to fund USDC purchase | Key risk: regulated rails potentially being used to “launder” gambling deposits into crypto transfers.
PaysafeCard (deposit option at casino) | paysafecard.com | (brand-level) | (varies) | (varies) | Voucher-based deposit method | If offered into offshore gambling, raises merchant acceptance / purpose-labelling questions.

Source notes (for the “known” legal-entity fields)

Chain Valley Sp. z o.o. (KRS 0001036419, Warsaw address) is stated on Chainvalley’s policy pages.

Chain Valley is listed in Poland’s “Rejestr działalności w zakresie walut wirtualnych” (virtual-currency activity register) with KRS 0001036419.

utPay.io Terms: “utPay.io refers to the company Utrg, UAB …”

Lithuanian company directory entry for UTRG, UAB shows website utpay.io and registration details.

CenturaPay site states it is a trading name of CANAMONEY EXCHANGE LTD, with MSB registration number displayed.

payment-gateway.io / app.payment-gateway.io appears in gambling-related scans/traffic context (useful as an OSINT pointer; operator still needs identification).

Call for Information

FinTelegram will publish detailed compliance reports on both Chain Valley and CenturaPay in the coming weeks.

If you are a Legiano player, a processor insider, or a merchant-risk/AML professional with knowledge of Chainvalley, utPay/UTRG, CenturaPay/CANAMONEY, or api.payment-gateway.io (merchant descriptors, acquiring banks, KYB files, screenshots, correspondence, blocked withdrawals, dispute outcomes), please submit information via Whistle42.com. FinTelegram will follow up with dedicated deep-dive compliance reports on Chainvalley and CenturaPay.