The Virtpay Vortex: How Half a Million High-Risk Transactions Are Laundered into Tier-1 Banks

Ben
Wed, 25 Feb 2026 13:22:43 +0000
Compliance, Illegal Payment Services, AgentGlobal, Fastpays, iGaming, Kipmotion, live.virtpay.net, Novilyo, Ongoingpayments, Puretransfer, Shadow Banking, Transaction Laundering, VirtPay

Operating deep within the shadow-banking ecosystem, live.virtpay.net acts as a massive funnel for unauthorized offshore casino deposits. Our latest traffic analysis reveals a startling reality: this anonymous gateway processed over 550,000 transactions in just one month, seamlessly routing illicit funds from European consumers directly into mainstream acquiring banks and 3D-Secure networks.

Analysis & Context: The Ultimate Layering Machine

In the complex world of high-risk payment routing, live.virtpay.net (operating as Virtpay/AgentGlobal) does not merely facilitate transactions; it aggressively mainlines them into the legitimate banking sector. Our Similarweb digital footprint analysis for January indicates over 550,000 visitors hit this anonymous gateway. Given the nature of this checkout page, these “visitors” represent live, real-time payment attempts.

Crucially, the traffic exclusively targets highly regulated European and UK markets, actively circumventing local gambling laws and consumer protection frameworks.

The Multi-Hop Pipeline:

Virtpay is a masterclass in transaction layering.

The Inbound Laundromat: Traffic flows into Virtpay from a web of notorious, anonymous high-risk gateways and traffic directors. Over 46% of this traffic originates from the casino industry. The top referring domains acting as feeders include gateway.puretransfer.io, acs.kipmotion.com, engine.ongoingpayments.io, acs.novilyo.com, and checkout.fastpays.org. This indicates Virtpay serves as a crucial “choke point” aggregating volume from multiple shadow PSPs.

The Outbound Legitimization: This is where the money is “cleaned.” After scrubbing the casino’s digital footprint, Virtpay passes the transaction directly to legitimate Tier-1 banking infrastructure. The top outgoing destinations are 3D-Secure and acquiring endpoints like 3dsecure.no (Norway), acs.smartpayments.ee (Estonia), nexigroup.com (Italy/EU), acs.revolut.com (UK/EU), and luottokunta.fi (Finland).

Domain Ownership and Technical Red Flags:

Attribution & Ownership: The ultimate beneficial owners of Virtpay remain hidden behind heavy WHOIS privacy shields. There is just a default hosting web page connected with the domain Virtpay.net. The platform offers zero corporate transparency, lacks a public-facing compliance officer, and provides no verifiable legal entity or operating address on its checkout pages.

Registrar & ISP: Like most shadow rails, virtpay.net utilizes privacy-guard registrars and routes its DNS through content delivery networks (like Cloudflare) to mask server IP addresses, preventing direct regulatory intervention.

API & Software Footprint: Developer documentation tied to the domain (doc.virtpay.net) references “AgentGlobal API,” suggesting they provide white-label processing solutions for other unauthorized offshore syndicates.

Ecosystem Summary

Domain | Domain Data | Known Connections | Role
live.virtpay.net | Privacy Shielded (Registrar/ISP Obscured) | Puretransfer, Novilyo, Nexi Group, Revolut | High-Risk Aggregator / Checkout Choke Point
Inbound Feeders | gateway.puretransfer.io, checkout.fastpays.org, acs.kipmotion.com, engine.ongoingpayments.io, checkout.fastpays.org | Unlicensed Offshore Casinos (>46% traffic) | Traffic Directors / Front-End Masking Rails
Outbound Settlers | nexigroup.com, acs.revolut.com, 3dsecure.no | Tier-1 Acquiring Banks / 3DS Networks | Legitimate Payment Settlement

Export to Sheets

Call to Action: Help Us Expose the Virtpay Network

FinTelegram is calling on FinTech compliance officers, former employees of European acquiring banks (specifically those linked to Nexi Group or Baltic PSPs), and payment industry insiders to step forward. We need your help to trace the fiat flowing through live.virtpay.net. We are specifically looking for:

The Merchant Identification Numbers (MIDs): Which specific MIDs are settling the traffic coming out of Virtpay into Tier-1 networks?

The Corporate Shells: Which front companies hold the acquiring accounts for Virtpay?

The Beneficial Owners: Who are the operators controlling the “AgentGlobal API” and the virtpay.net domain portfolio?

If you have processing agreements, MID lists, or internal emails detailing this network, please share them with us. Your identity and security are strictly protected.

Submit your tips securely via our whistleblower platform: